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Activism, Separation of Powers and Development 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We consider a model of constitutional (mechanism) design with separation of 
powers where different institutions are assigned different tasks. In this context, we define 
activism as an institution extending its mechanism of decision-making into the domain of 
other institution’s tasks. When members of the institutions are likely to be benevolent as 
well as non-benevolent, such activism in a limited form reduces the cost of achieving 
collusion-proofness and raises welfare. Hence the value of such activism can be 
potentially very high in the context of developing economies. But as the fraction of non-
benevolent member increases, such activism turns excessive and reduces welfare. It is 
argued that developing economies are likely to get caught in the excessive activism trap 
because of the high levels of corruption and bribery. 
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 “I cannot altogether omit the possibility of a Legislature packed by party men making laws which 
may abrogate or violate what we regard as fundamental principles affecting the life and liberty of 
an individual. At the same time, I do not see how five or six gentlemen sitting in the Federal or 
Supreme Court….and by dint of their own individual conscience or bias or prejudices be trusted 
to determine which law is good and which law is bad”    
 
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar in Constituent Assembly Debate1 
 
 
                                                
1. Introduction 
 
Institutions play an undeniably important role in the process of development. At 
the same time, as the above quote suggests, framing of suitable institutions involves 
many trade offs and frictions. In such a context, separation of powers has been seen as a 
key feature of modern democratic governance.  Most constitutions adhere to this doctrine 
in their designs of institutions (legislative, executive and judiciary). The same philosophy 
is also reflected in the design of many other organizations like regulatory and 
enforcement bodies, ministries and governmental departments.  
Despite the presence of such well defined institutions, some of these institutions 
fail to deliver in many cases. This inefficient functioning is perhaps more striking in the 
context of many developing economies. As is often believed, this could lead to other 
institutions to step into the functional spheres of these failing institutions and extend their 
field of activities in a spontaneous manner. In this paper, we address this issue of 
institutional activism in terms of its origin and consequences.  
Separation of powers can be analyzed by exploring its structural as well as 
functional aspects. From a structural perspective, separation can be seen as a device 
against regulatory capture and rent seeking behavior. Even though the general idea is not 
new2, it is only recently that economic theorists have addressed this topic using agency 
theoretic framework. These institutions can be viewed as agencies entrusted with certain 
tasks. To perform these tasks, they are endowed with some power as well. If too many 
tasks are given to one agency, then the agency is likely to enjoy greater power also. That 
would encourage collusive and rent seeking behavior. In a recent paper, Laffont and 
 
1 Referring to the debate during the framing of the Constitution of India, Constituent Assembly Debate Vol. 
7 page 1000 (Lok Shabha Secretariat, New Delhi) 
2 Laffont (2000) contains a rich and scholarly treatment of these issues. See Moe (1986), Wilson  (1980) for 
earlier contributions. In a similar vein Seabright (1996), Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) look at regulatory 
capture in the context of decentralization of power. 
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 Meleu (2001) have modeled separation of powers as an instrument against corruption and 
have shown that the value of such separation is higher in developing countries. The 
characteristics of developing countries make separation of powers more desirable but at 
the same time more difficult to implement.  
 An alternative route to analyze separation is through the functional interpretation. 
In this case different decision-making bodies of the State (legislature, executive and 
judiciary) are endowed with specific powers and are required to carry out different tasks. 
These institutions differ in terms of operating principles, stipulated objectives and the 
nature of information processing.  Hence different institutions are best equipped to solve 
different decision problems facing the state, depending on the information requirements 
and the cost of information processing3. For example, the legislature can be thought of as 
the body best suited to obtaining information on the preferences of the population.  Hence 
it is supposed to enact laws to suit the best interest of the population. On the other hand, 
for the judiciary, the population preference is not of paramount importance; rather it is 
supposed to gather judicial information from contesting parties and take decisions which 
are deemed to be fair4. At a different level, the executive can be thought to be in charge 
of gathering and processing technical, statistical information so as to implement the will 
of the legislature in the most efficient manner.  Hence, according to this interpretation, 
we are likely to see separation of powers even when there is no rent seeking behavior or 
collusion possibility.  
To study activism, we superimpose the possibility of collusive and corrupt 
behavior on such a framework. In addition to their own tasks, institutions are granted 
privileges so that they can have access to information or decision making process of other 
institutions. In this context, we define activism as an institution extending its mechanism 
of decision-making, on the grounds of privilege, into the domain of some other 
institution5. In many ways, such privileges act as checks and balances. As we shall see, 
                                                 
3 This is very similar to the analyses in the law and economics literature of the different choices faced by 
the state in allocating resources (i.e. property rule vs. liability rule). See Calabresi and Melamed (1972); 
Kaplow and Shavell (1996). 
4 Some of these differences and their implications have been recently modeled by Maskin and Tirole 
(2004). They study the optimal allocation of power between accountable and non-accountable branches of 
the state. See Persson et.al (1997) also for an analysis of separation of powers and political accountability. 
5 This is similar to the definition used in Anant and Singh (2002). The next section discusses their 
contribution.  
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 activism can raise welfare by reducing the cost of collusion-proofness, but it can turn 
excessive and can lead to welfare reduction. We take the separation of power structure to 
be given and try to analyze the nature and consequences of activism by different 
institutions. Our emphasis on corruption in this context makes our analysis more relevant 
to the developing economies where corruption has been rampant and has threatened the 
developmental process. 
In a full information complete contracting setup, an ideal constitution would 
specify all decisions to be taken (in all contingencies). Hence it does not matter who takes 
those decisions and power is irrelevant. One can depart from this paradigm in two ways. 
One would be to allow for information asymmetry and control over information by the 
agency. This way, information rent would be the source of power. The other approach 
would be to adopt an incomplete contract framework where institutions are given 
decision rights. We follow the former approach here. Following, Laffont and Meleu 
(2001) and Laffont and Martimort (1999), we analyze activism in a regulatory 
framework. Hence, activism in this specific context will refer to the phenomenon of an 
institution trying to get access to regulatory information of other institutions. We are 
interested in the positive as well as normative aspects of activism. We try to see when 
activism is more likely to surface and what its implications for social welfare are.  
Our paper is related to at least three different strands of literature. As mentioned 
earlier, our analysis of activism is related to the recent work on separation of powers by 
Persson et al. (1997), Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), Laffont and Meleu (2001) and 
Maskin and Tirole (2004). The basic modeling builds on the regulatory governance 
literature (Laffont and Tirole (1993), Laffont and Martimort (1999)). Some of the results 
concerning the welfare properties of activism are related to the literature on collusion 
(Tirole (1992), Kofman and Lawaree (1993)).  
The next section outlines some of these issues based on a brief discussion of 
judicial activism in India. Section 3 presents the basic model of regulatory design with 
collusion possibilities. Institutions are viewed as supervisory bodies, each institution 
having benevolent as well as non-benevolent supervisors. Section 4 contains the main 
results and analysis of activism. We show that limited activism (activism by benevolent 
supervisors) raises welfare in some situations. But as corruption level rises the non-
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 benevolent supervisors also pursue activist policies and this can reduce welfare. Section 5 
discusses various interpretations and possible extensions of the basic framework.  Section 
6 concludes with a few brief remarks. 
2. Judicial Activism in India6 
 
 Judicial activism in India has been perceived in certain quarters as a success of 
constitutional governance, while others have sought to condemn it. This intervention by 
the courts has taken place in the background of a widespread popular perception that 
institutions like the legislature and executive branches of the government have not 
performed efficiently due to the rise of corruption and nepotism.  Hence the intervention 
and activist policy by the Supreme Court has been seen as a welcome relief to many. Our 
objective is not to debate the merit of such a policy on a case by case basis; we are 
interested in looking at the general process. 
  The appearance of judicial activism in India has its origin in the emergence of 
Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the late 1970s. These cases saw the Supreme Court 
enlarge its reach and jurisdiction by both re-interpreting the constitution to expand the 
scope and content of various fundamental rights, and also, by moderating the ancient 
requirement of locus standi for access to judicial remedies and redress. As a 
consequence, procedural requirements were eased to enable individuals or organizations 
to approach the Supreme Court and High Courts on the behalf of those unable to do so 
themselves - “in the public interest”. Typically these cases dealt with gross violation of 
rights of women and children and the abysmal work conditions faced by poor and bonded 
labor 7. However the late eighties and the nineties saw the courts using the PIL for a much 
larger set of issues involving the environment, the practices of municipal corporations, 
protection of ancient monuments, fees and admission rules in educational institutions, 
                                                 
6 Many developing economies have the opposite problem of non-existent or weak judiciary (legislative 
activism). Judiciary in India has been traditionally strong and independent. The attention on judicial 
activism is fairly recent. In the developed economies, judicial activism has been a debated issue in the legal 
and political spheres. See O’Connor (1997), Allan (1997), Lens (2001) among others.  
7 Among many other cases see, for example, for under trail prisoners: Hussainara Khatoon v. Bihar 1979 
SC 1360; prison inmates: Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration AIR 1982 SC 1473; women in protective 
custody: Dr. Upendra Baxi v. U.P (1983) 2 SCC 308; Bonded Labor: Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. India 
(1984) 3 SCC 161; Air Pollution in Delhi: MC Mehta v. Union of India(1991) 2 SCC 137; Forest 
Conservation: TN Godavarman Thirumalapad v. Union of India (1997) 2 SCC 267. See Ahuja (1997) for a 
detailed compendium and classification of these cases 
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 selection of Judges, the functioning of politicians and political parties amongst others.8 In 
many such instances, courts have sought to prescribe public policy outcomes. This 
extension of the field of intervention has led to serious public debate on judicial activism 
in India by politicians, administrators and legal scholars. 9  The practice of courts 
changing or expanding the interpretation of law has been the subject of extensive debate 
in legal and philosophical circles. 10   However the expanded domain of the Indian 
judiciary needs a more elaborate description.  
In a recent article, Anant and Singh (2002), using a framework of transactions 
costs to define a structure of functional separation of powers, describe judicial activism in 
three forms- interpretational, legislative and executive - each with distinct implications 
on allocation and efficiency. The classification is based on the character of the activist 
Judgment. While the first involves novel interpretation of the law and it has been 
discussed and debated extensively in the context of the appropriate role of the courts, the 
latter two may need elaboration. 
An example of legislative judicial activism is to be found in the famous judgment 
of Vishaka vs. State of Rajasthan. In this case the Supreme Court specified a model law 
to prevent sexual harassment. This was done to remedy the inadequacy of the existing 
legal system where the civil and penal law in India does not protect women from sexual 
harassment in the work place.  In the case of  Vineet Narain vs. Union of India,  the court 
sought to provide a autonomous space for the Central Bureau of Investigation and has 
outlined through directives the requirement that the Chief Vigilance Commissioner be 
given statutory status, and proceeded to outline the conditions of service, responsibility 
etc. In Malpe Viswanath Acharya vs. Maharastra, the court effectively directed the State 
Legislature to amend the law on rent control as the existing law was found to be imposing 
unreasonable restrictions on the right to carry on any trade or business guaranteed by the 
article 19(1)g of the Constitution.  
Similarly there have been many instances of the court taking on a more executive 
role. Thus as part of the MC Mehta vs. Union of India, a PIL aimed at reducing vehicular 
                                                 
8 In a series of judgments the Supreme Court vested the power of appointment of judges in a collegium 
consisting of the Chief Justice and four senior judges. Interestingly, this issue was heard as PIL by the 
Lawyer’s Association whose fundamental right to judicial autonomy was being affected.  
9 See Sathe (2002) for a detailed and scholarly analysis of judicial activism in India. 
10  See for instance the discussion in Dworkin (1977) or more recently in Scalia  and Gutmann (1998) 
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 pollution in Delhi, the court has  issued a number of wide ranging policy directives. 
These include restrictions on the plying of all old (more than 15 years) commercial 
vehicles; elimination of leaded petrol from NCT of Delhi; replacement of all pre-1990 
auto-rickshaws and taxis with new vehicles on clean fuels; steady conversion of the entire 
city bus fleet (DTC and private) to single fuel mode on CNG; and safety restrictions on 
the operations of school buses, advertisements on the side of the road and so on. It is 
clear that all these relate to the choice of technology, inputs of production, location of bus 
stations, qualifications and skills of drivers- decisions typically to be made by the 
executive branch of government11.  
A fascinating aspect of all these cases is that they take a life of their own, 
changing petitioners, lawyers and even issues as the case and events develop. In some of 
these cases, the court has not been free from populist concerns. For example, in the 
Common Cause vs. Union of India or the Shiv Sagar Tiwari vs Union of India cases, the 
court tried to address the issue of abuse of ministerial power in the allotment of goods 
and licenses. After canceling the allotments, the court went on to levy ‘exemplary fines’ 
on the public servants but these fines were more of a populist gesture and these were 
withdrawn later because of questionable legal grounds. Similarly, in the rent control case 
referred to earlier, the court was held to have acted in the interest of the landlords or the 
richer sections of the society and hence the court remained silent when the legislature 
failed to bring about any effective change in the legislation.  
The discussion should not lead one to conclude that activism is limited to the 
Judiciary. Elected representatives have raised issues relating to appropriate support prices 
for agricultural goods, the interest rates on small savings. Pricing of electricity has found 
its way into party manifestos. These are examples of the elected representatives 
concerning themselves with technical executive concerns of pricing.  
It is not our case to suggest that these decisions are good or bad, they have been 
extensively discussed in the policy discussion in India. The issue here is to seek a 
framework to analyze the process.  We wish to point out that the process can encourage 
activists with their own agenda and affect the long term credibility of the institution. 
                                                 
11 Interim orders dated 28th July 1998 and 22nd Sept. 1998  on  Writ Petition (Civil) No. 130295/1985 put in 
front of the Supreme Court by M.C. Mehta.  See Anant and Singh (2002) for a critique. 
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 3. The Model 
In this section, we consider a very simple and specialized model of activism. The 
model is not designed to capture the richness of activism described in the previous 
section. However, we hope to show how some forms of activism lead to welfare increases 
but once activism becomes an institution in itself the result could be excessive activism 
and abuse of privileges leading to welfare loss.  
Suppose one unit of a public good is to be produced by a firm with private 
information about its cost and it is to be procured by the constitution (henceforth called 
the principal). The social benefit from this good is G and the cost of production is given 
by C = θ, where θ is the cost parameter.12  Firm’s cost could be low, medium or high. Let 
cost parameter be given by θ = θ  – (θ_ 1+ θ2), where θi ∈ {0, ∆θ}, i∈{1,2}. Hence, 
depending on the realization of θi, θ can take three values, θ ,θ  or ˆ θ  where =  θˆ θ - ∆θ 
and   θ = θ -2∆θ.  The random variables θi, are drawn independently from the same 
distribution so that Pr(θi=∆θ) = υ.  We can interpret ∆θ as favorable cost conditions, and 
these determine whether the actual cost of production would be low or not.  
 
3.1  Technology 
The principal employs politicians/executive/judiciary (henceforth called 
supervisors) to supervise the firm and obtain information on θi. There is an independent 
supervision technology which generates hard information on θi. The supervisor may 
observe the favorable condition (∆θ), but with some positive probability he may not 
observe anything (φ). This technology (ζ-technology) generates signals σi with the 
following probabilities; 
(1)  Pr(σi = ∆θθi = ∆θ) = ζ and Pr(σi = φθi = ∆θ) = 1-ζ, 
Pr(σi = ∆θ) = υζ and Pr(σi = φ)= (1-υζ ). 
                                                 
12 This is similar to Martimort (1996). This is a simpler and slightly modified version of Laffont and 
Martimort (1999), see Laffont (2000) and Tirole (1992) also. 
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 Separation of powers13 implies that supervisor 1 (called S1) has access to information 
technology 1 which generates signal σ1 about θ1. Likewise, supervisor 2 (called S2) 
observes σ2.  Let ri denote the report by the supervisor i, ri ∈ {φ, ∆θ}, i = 1,2. 
Suppose there is another information technology which enables S1 to observe a 
signal µ of σ2, in addition to signal σ1 of θ1.  We shall focus on the asymmetric case 
where only S1 has access to such technology.  The symmetric case is discussed later 
(section 5.4). We assume that the distribution of µ is conditional on σ2 = ∆θ. Assuming 
S2 to be using the ζ-technology, this activist technology (referred to as ρ-technology) has 
the following property; 
(2)  Pr(σ1 = ∆θθ1 = ∆θ) = ρ and Pr(σ1 = φθ1 = ∆θ) = 1-ρ, 
Pr(µ = ∆θσ2 = ∆θ) = β/ and Pr(µ = φσ2 = ∆θ) = 1-β/, 
Pr(µ = ∆θθ2 = ∆θ) = ζβ/= β  
We assume that this activist technology leads to some dilution in one’s own task, so α = 
(ζ-ρ) > 0.14  Corresponding to µ, the activist report is denoted by z, z ∈ {φ, ∆θ}. The 
technological inefficiency associated with activism is captured by α and β.  
3.2   Preferences: 
The firm’s utility is given by U(θ) = t –θ, where t is the transfer payment by the 
principal to the firm.  
We have two types of supervisors- benevolent (b) and non-benevolent (nb). The 
principal does not know the type of the supervisor and we assume that there is no 
screening mechanism to separate the two types. The probability of supervisor S1 (S2) 
being benevolent is given by δ1 (δ2), 0≤ δi ≤1. We shall assume that supervisors are risk 
neutral. The utility to a supervisor is given by 
(3) Vi = E (s + aB + cA)     a, c ≥ 0, a+c = 1,  i= b,nb 
where E is the expectation operator, s refers to monetary transfer from the principal, B 
refers to bribe income and A refers to non-monetary benefits ; a and c are weights. Non-
                                                 
13 We take separation of powers to be given and do not seek to prove its optimality. As has been shown by 
Laffont (2000), separation of powers can be shown to be optimal in a variety of cases. In the present 
context, one can assume that the joint observation technology is inefficient compared to separate 
observation technology.  
14 This is consistent with the separation of powers argument. Moreover, it ties well with the functional 
separation. The nature of information gathering in the two different tasks is different and there is some 
benefit to specialization. 
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 monetary benefits are associated only with activist reporting. These can be interpreted as 
the satisfaction one derives from leaving a legacy or the satisfaction from public 
adulation and popularity.15 Benevolent supervisors place zero weight on bribe income. 
Likewise, non-benevolent supervisors put zero weight on non-monetary benefits.  
We shall assume that the good is always desirable. Social welfare16 is given by 
(4)  SW = G – E (t+s1+s2)    
Since the good is always desirable, the principal is interested in minimizing the sum of 
expected transfers to the firm (t) and the supervisors (s1 and s2). We assume the 
reservation utilities of the firm and the supervisors to be zero. All transfers are non-
negative. The principal maximizes (4) subject to the following constraints. 
(5)  U(θ) ≥ 0, Vi ≥ 0.  
 
3.3 Benchmark Case 
The principal can achieve the First Best level of welfare when she has full 
information about θi. First best level would be obtained by setting t = θi and expected 
welfare will be given by  
(6)  SWFB = G – υ2(θ -2∆θ)-2υ(1-υ)( θ  -∆θ) – (1-υ)2(θ ).   
In the absence of any information, the principal would always be willing to set the 
transfer at the maximum (t =θ ) to make sure that the project goes ahead. Without any 
supervisory information, there is no mechanism to learn the information about true θ 
since the firm would hide its low cost nature and try to get a higher transfer. Welfare in 
such a case will be given by SW = G- θ  < SWFB. 
Unless it is highly costly to employ supervisors, the principal will benefit from 
employing supervisors to seek information about θ. Suppose the principal is able to 
obtain truthful reports from the supervisors and the supervisors employ the technology 
                                                 
15 This is somewhat similar to the legacy motive in Maskin and Tirole (2004). As they argue, it is not very 
standard in political economy models but it is quite realistic.  We include the popularity aspect also in our 
case. In the context of our discussion of Judicial activism, we believe that this could be a strong 
contributing factor, especially because a judgment in the activist mould would be front page news in most 
national dailies whereas a routine legal judgment is hardly noticed. 
16 We have not included the utility of the firm in the welfare. But it can be done without any change to the 
results. SW = G – (1+λ)t + U = G – (1+λ)(U+θq) + U = G –(1+λ)θq –λU, where λ is the shadow cost of 
public funds. For λ>0, we will get similar results. 
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 given in (1). In state σ1 = σ2 = ∆θ, which occurs with probability (υζ)2 , the principal 
would choose  t = θ  and U(θ ) = 0.  With probability 2 υζ (1- υζ), we have another state, 
σi = φ and σj = ∆θ where i≠j, i,j ∈{1,2}; the optimal policy would be t = θ  and U(ˆ θ ) = 
∆θ and U( ) = 0. Finally, with probability (1- υζ)θˆ 2, both the signals yield nothing, σ1 = 
σ2= φ and the principal would choose t = θ , U(θ ) = 0, U( θ )= ∆θ and U(ˆ θ ) = 2∆θ.  
Whenever the principal is not fully informed, the firm gets a rent with positive 
probability (depending on the type). Since supervisors’ reservation utility is assumed to 
be zero, the principal would set si = 0. The second best level of welfare is given by 
(7) SWSB = G – (υζ)2(θ -2∆θ)-2υζ(1-υζ)( θ  -∆θ) – (1-υζ)2(θ ) 
3.4 Collusion 
Only supervisors observe signals σi and they are supposed to report the signals to 
the principal. They derive their power from being able to manipulate this information. In 
our case, this ability is somewhat limited by the hard nature of this information. The 
supervisor can only hide information but is not able to distort it in any other way. The 
supervisor, having learnt about the favorable cost condition, can always claim to have 
learnt nothing. 
As can be seen from the previous analysis, whenever σi = ∆θ and the supervisor 
reports r = φ, the firm17 gains ∆θ. Hence the supervisor and the firm can collude-firm 
bribing the supervisor for a null report. As is standard in the literature, we assume that the 
supervisor has all the bargaining power and can appropriate the entire rent. The 
supervisor makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer, which the firm can accept or reject.  
However, there is a transaction cost associated with bribery so that a bribe of ∆θ is worth 
k∆θ to the supervisor, where k< 1.   If the bribe demand is accepted, the supervisor 
submits a report which maximizes joint payoffs. Otherwise, the supervisor reports to 
maximize own payoff. Whenever indifferent, the supervisor reports truthfully. 
With the activist technology, we can have collusion between the two supervisors. 
We assume a similar bargaining environment except that supervisor S1 (S2) makes such 
                                                 
17 The gains are additive. If one report is ∆θ and the other is φ, the most efficient firm gains ∆θ. If both 
reports are φ, the firm gains 2∆θ.  Strictly speaking we don’t need this additive structure. A more plausible 
case would be when the gain from two null reports exceeds the sum of gains from null reports by 1 and 2. 
This formulation is for simplicity. 
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 a take-it-or-leave-it offer with probability ½ which the other supervisor can accept or 
reject. This is equivalent to assuming equal bargaining powers. To illustrate, suppose by 
colluding the supervisors get a joint payoff of D and failure to collude would give them 
d1 and d2 respectively. Then, in a collusive agreement between the two supervisors, Sj 
will get dj +1/2 (D-d1-d2).   We shall assume that there is no transaction cost associated 
with this type of collusion.18  
With activism, three-way collusion between the firm and the two supervisors is 
also possible. The bargaining rule is similar. Supervisor S1 (S2) gets to propose with 
probability ½ which the firm and S2 (S1) can accept or reject. Note that in this case, since 
the firm is involved in the collusion, there is a transaction cost exactly like the first case. 
3.5  Separation of powers and Collusion-proofness 
The game proceeds as follows. (1) A constitution is set up; the principal 
announces the contract. (2) Nature determines the type of the firm (realization of θ) and 
the type of the supervisor (benevolent or not). (3) The supervisors choose the technology 
(activist or non-activist). (4) The supervisors observe their respective signals. Firms learn 
the type of supervisor(s) and the value of their signals. (5) The firm and the supervisor(s) 
can collude on a side contract. (6) The supervisors submit their reports to the principal 
and transfers are implemented according to the original contract.  
The contract at stage 1 specifies transfers t and s as functions of the reports (r1, z, 
r2) by S1 and S2, t = t(r1, z, r2) and sj =sj(r1, z, r2), j=1,2. When the principal commits to 
disregard activist report (z) and specifies t = t(r1, r2) and sj =sj(rj), we shall refer to it as 
the case of strict separation of powers. In such a case supervisors will choose the non-
activist technology.  
Note that the principal has to make two sets of decisions (1) whether to allow or 
induce activism and (2) whether to allow the different collusion possibilities. Both these 
decisions are related. In the current subsection we shall focus only on the strict separation 
case.  
                                                 
18 One possible explanation for this transaction cost relates to the probable detection of the firm’s type at 
some stage. If θj were to be discovered, then the principal can investigate and find out that bribery took 
place between the firm and supervisor j. If we continue with this interpretation, then collusion between the 
two supervisors will have no such transaction cost when σ2= ∆θ and the collusive report is also ∆θ.   
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 The principal can prevent collusion between the firm and the supervisor by 
stipulating suitable rewards for reporting favorable cost conditions. As discussed earlier, 
based on truthful reports, the principal would choose the following transfers to the firms, 
(9) t(φ,φ) = θ , t(φ,∆θ) = t(∆θ,φ) =  , t(∆θ,∆θ) = θˆ θ . 
Given our assumptions regarding bargaining environment, the supervisor gets k∆θ from 
colluding with the firm (whenever σ = ∆θ).  Hence, a reward of k∆θ would induce the 
supervisor to report truthfully; s(φ) = 0 and s(∆θ) = k∆θ. Since the principal is unable to 
condition transfers on the type of the supervisor, same transfer would be paid to the 
benevolent supervisor as well.  Let WNC be the welfare under strict separation when there 
is no collusion.  
 (10)  WNC = G – {(υζ )2(θ+2k∆θ) + 2(υζ)(1-υζ)( +k∆θ) + (1-υζ )θˆ 2 θ } 
On the other hand, since the benevolent supervisors are going to report truthfully even in 
the absence of any payment; the principal might prefer to pay no rewards and as a 
consequence allow collusion between the non-benevolent supervisors and the firm.  If 
there are too many benevolent supervisors (δ is high), then such a policy might indeed be 
optimal. Let WC denote the corresponding welfare.  
(11) WC = G – [δ1δ2 {(υζ )2(θ ) + 2(υζ)(1-υζ)( θ ) + (1-υζ )ˆ 2 θ }+ {δ1(1-δ2)+δ2(1-
δ1)}{(υζ )2(θ ) + (υζ)(1-υζ)( + ˆ θˆ θ ) + (1-υζ )2 θ }+ (1-δ1)(1-δ2) θ ]. 
It can be checked that WSB > WC, WNC. The welfare loss due to collusion is given by 
(WSB – WC) and the welfare loss due to the cost of preventing collusion is given by (WSB 
– WNC). These losses will depend on the benevolence level (δ) and transaction cost 
associated with collusion (1-k). In a developing economy with widespread corruption and 
poor enforcement we expect δ to be low and k to be high. 
4.  Activism 
 
According to our earlier definition, activism refers to an institution extending its 
mechanism of decision-making. This presupposes that the extension by the activist 
institution is indeed feasible and members of the activist institution have the incentives to 
do so.  In the present context, feasibility implies that the supervisor has access to the 
activist technology and the principal does not commit to strict separation of powers.  
 13
 What constitutes an inducement for a member to be an activist depends on the specific 
context. It could range from personal commitment to a cause and concern for social 
welfare to the other extreme case of pure rent seeking. We try to capture this spectrum by 
considering different values for A in the supervisor’s utility function (3).  
Suppose A is high such that the benevolent S1 does not need any monetary 
compensation to be an activist. In that case, S1 may receive financial rewards for report r1 
(task), but similar rewards are absent for any report z (pure privilege).  The absence of 
any incentive payment is one of the critical aspects of activism in this case. This task-
privilege interpretation seems suitable for some forms of activism. This would match the 
popular perception of activism, where activists are always thought to be welfare minded 
individuals and are committed to the cause of promoting social welfare and not private 
gains. On the other hand, a regulator might have explicit incentives for the supervisor to 
oversee another supervisor. In that case activism can be viewed as an additional task. 
This multi-task situation will be captured by allowing for A = 0.  As a first step we shall 
be dealing with the privilege interpretation and take up the general formulation in the 
next section.  
4.1  Limited and Excessive Activism:  
This section presents a heuristic analysis of the costs and benefits associated with 
activism. To begin with consider the case where supervisors receive a fixed wage and 
only transfers to the firm are chosen by the principal. This implies that si(φ) = si(∆θ) = 0 
and t = t(r1,z,r2).  Now consider the situation where the benevolent S1 chooses the activist 
technology. We shall refer to it as a case of limited activism.  
In this case, the principal can prevent collusion between the firm and non-
benevolent S2 whenever µ = ∆θ. More specifically, the principal can choose transfers to 
the firm as follows: 
(12)  t(φ,φ,φ) = θ , t(φ,∆θ) = t(∆θ,φ,φ) =t(φ,φ,∆θ) =  , t(∆θ,φ,∆θ) = t(∆θ,∆θ) = θˆ θ . 
This means that the non-benevolent S2 can collude with the firm less often due to 
activism by S1.19 If S1 is benevolent and successfully observes µ = ∆θ, then the firm does 
                                                 
19 In many ways, these activists can be viewed as whistle blowers. The role of external auditors (activist S1) 
in preventing collusion between the firm and the internal auditor (S2) has been examined in the collusion 
context by Kofman and Lawaree (1993).  See Kofman and Lawaree (1996) and Mishra (2002) also. 
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 not gain anything by colluding and the principal does not have to leave excess rent to the 
firm. Since benevolent S2 will report truthfully in any case, activist reporting by S1 is 
valuable to the principal to the extent S2 is non-benevolent (1-δ2). On the other hand, 
S1’s own signal becomes less informative. Hence conditional on θ1 = ∆θ, the loss will be 
δ1α∆θ. Activism by the benevolent S1 will raise welfare iff 
(13)   δ1(1-δ2)β∆θ ≥ δ1α∆θ  or δ2 ≤ 1-α/β.  
This confirms the common perception that limited activism by an institution is 
likely to be optimal when the level of rent seeking or non-benevolence is high in the other 
institution. But will benevolent S1 be willing to choose the activist technology? In this 
case, the benevolent S1 observes σ1 with a smaller probability but that does not affect his 
utility. Hence, for any A≥0, the benevolent S1 will choose the activist technology. This 
also means that the benevolent S1 would be inclined to choose the activist technology 
even when δ2 is high.  However, as we shall see in the next section, such a case will not 
arise because the principal can always take away the activist privileges and implement 
strict separation of powers. In some sense, most constitutions will allow for some form of 
limited activism of the kind we have discussed above. However, as we shall show the 
problem with activism begins when individuals choose to be activist for purely private 
considerations. 
 The non-benevolent S1 can also choose the activist technology. The non-
benevolent S1 can get a share in the total rent of ∆θ, whenever σ2 = ∆θ and µ = ∆θ; and 
S2 is non-benevolent. Using our bargaining rule and (12), it can be checked that non-
benevolent S2’s expected gain from activism is (1-δ2)βk∆θ/2. On the other hand, his 
expected loss is αk∆θ. Non-benevolent S1 will choose to be activist if the degree of non-
benevolence in the other institution is very high. But these are precisely the cases where 
activism by the benevolent S1 would raise welfare by reducing the cost of collusion. This 
means that for lower values of δ2 we expect to see activism by both benevolent and non-
benevolent S1. We refer to it as a case of excessive activism.  
Activism by the non-benevolent S1 has no welfare implications in this simple 
case. Recall that the principal does not benefit from non-benevolent S1’s realization of 
signal σ1 because of collusion. Hence the loss of information due to the activist 
technology leads to no additional loss. On the other hand, principal does not gain from 
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 activism due to the non-revelation of activist information. Activism by the non-
benevolent leads to a redistribution of rents with S2 being the loser. This is quite 
different from activism by the benevolent S1 which leads to dissipation of rents 
whenever condition (13) is satisfied.   
 This ties well with our discussion in section 2 where we pointed out that a 
frequently encountered explanation of judicial activism is the high levels of corruption 
and rent seeking in other institutions like the legislature or the executive. The previous 
analysis would suggest that reducing corruption and inefficiencies through proper 
incentives in these branches of governance would reduce the benefit of activism. As we 
shall see this need not be the case. If these incentives have to be implemented through 
costly transfers, then activism has a role in reducing costly transfers.  
Suppose in the initial constitution supervisors receive positive transfers for 
reporting ∆θ; si(φ) = 0 and si(∆θ) = k∆θ. Following our bargaining rule the non-
benevolent supervisor gets k∆θ by colluding with the firm and reporting r = φ. Hence 
with these transfers, collusion will not take place. Since the activist S1 can observe a 
signal of S2’s information, the principal can use this information to reduce payments to 
S2. Suppose transfer payments to S2 are as follows.  
(14) s2(z = φ and r2 = ∆θ) = k∆θ and s2 = 0 otherwise.  
This means that conditional on σ2 = ∆θ, the principal has to pay k∆θ to S2 with 
probability (1-β).   
When the benevolent S1 chooses to be activist, the principal would reduce its cost 
by δ1υβk∆θ. 20  This term does not depend on δ2 because both benevolent and non-
benevolent supervisors receive the same incentive transfers. Like the previous case, 
activism would lead to a reduction in welfare as the activist technology is less 
informative about own signal θ1. Hence the loss in welfare due to the ρ-technology will 
be given by δ1υα∆θ(1-k).  Following activism by the non-benevolent S1, overall welfare 
will go up iff  
(15) δ1υβk∆θ ≥ δ1υα ∆θ(1-k) 
or,  k ≥ α/(α+β). 
                                                 
20 We continue to assume that A is high enough so that benevolent S1 always prefers to be an activist 
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 Hence limited activism is likely to be optimal when transaction costs are low. 21  When k 
is close to 1, there is virtually no transaction cost associated with collusion; the cost of 
preventing collusion is very high and hence activism raises welfare by lowering this cost. 
Combined with (12) this would suggest that the optimality of activism would depend on 
the degree of benevolence, size of transaction costs and the efficiency of the activist 
technology.  
Unlike the previous case, activism by the non-benevolent can lead to an overall 
increase in rent and hence a reduction in welfare. The loss due to activism will be (1-
δ1)υα∆θ(1-k). Using a contract similar to (14), the gain will be δ2(1- δ1)υα∆θk. Notice 
that the principal is unable to save on the transfer payments when both activist S1 and S2 
are non-benevolent. Hence gain is always at the expense of benevolent S2. In this case 
net gain from activism can be positive for very high values of δ2.  However, this is 
unlikely to happen on two accounts. First, high values of δ would mean that rent seeking 
is limited and there is no need to have a system of transfer payments. Second, the 
incentive for non-benevolent to participate in activism will still be given by (13) and this 
implies that δ2 has to be low for them to be interested in activism. Hence, whenever non-
benevolent supervisor finds it worthwhile to engage in activism, it is likely to be 
suboptimal from the principal’s point of view.  
Now, let us consider the case where the legacy motive associated with activism is 
not very strong, A is small. Since ρ ≤ ζ, the supervisor is going to get his rewards k∆θ 
with a smaller probability. If a report of z = ∆θ does not fetch anything to the supervisor, 
a non-benevolent supervisor may not be interested in switching to the activist technology. 
Hence the principal has to induce activism by stipulating positive transfers for an activist 
report z = ∆θ. The amount of this transfer depends on the value of A. A formal derivation 
of this incentive constraint is given in the next section. The implication of this constraint 
is two fold. First, it makes limited activism less attractive. The principal has to transfer a 
part of the cost savings to the activist S1. The range of values for which activism is 
optimal becomes smaller (compared to 15). Second, for extremely low values of A, non-
benevolent S1 will always find it optimal to be activist. The loss from activism is same 
                                                 
21 See Laffont and Meleu (2001) for a related argument concerning the value of separation of powers when 
transaction costs are low. However, in our case, if k is very high we might not have any collusion 
prevention and the relevant welfare is Wc. 
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 for both benevolent and non-benevolent, but the non-benevolent stands to gain more. 
Hence for A = 0, activism will always be excessive. The principal can never induce 
activism by benevolent and at the same time prevent activism by the non-benevolent. In 
fact the cost of inducement has implications for the policy towards collusion also. We 
turn to these issues in the next section.   
 4.2  Activism and Optimal Constitutional Design 
In this section we discuss the conditions under which the principal would choose 
to have activism in the optimal contract. This does not mean that actual constitution is 
being adjusted continuously to different parameter changes, but we want to see to what 
extent activism features in an optimal constitution. The principal has to make two sets of 
decisions. First, she has to choose between strict separation of powers and activism. 
Second she has to choose the extent to which collusion can be allowed in the optimal 
contract. However, these two sets of decisions are not independent and can not be 
separated.   
Recall that transfers to the firm and the supervisors are given by t = t(r1,z,r2) and  
s = s(r1,z,r2) respectively, ri,r2,z ∈ {φ, ∆θ}.  We do not consider situations where the 
activist S1 reports ∆θ and the benevolent S2 reports φ. In the light of our assumption (4), 
this state can never occur. Moreover, since a non-activist can also submit a null report, it 
is always optimal to have zero transfer to S1 whenever z = φ.  Hence, without any loss of 
generality, we shall denote transfers to S1 by the two components s1= s1(r1), a = a(∆θ). 
Likewise, transfers to S2 is given by s2= s2(z,r2).  
Depending on whether the optimal contract entails collusion and activism, 
transfers need to satisfy some subset of the following no-collusion constraints. Given the 
bargaining rule (section3.4), collusion between the firm and the supervisor can be 
prevented if the following condition is satisfied. 
(16) (t(φ1 ,z,r2) - t(∆θ;z,r2))k ≤ s1(∆θ) – s1(φ) for any given z and r2 
(17) (t(r1,z,φ) - t(r1,z,∆θ))k ≤ s2(z,∆θ) – s2(z,φ) for any given z and r1 
Similarly, collusion between the supervisors is prevented if  
(18) s2(φ, ∆θ) – s2(∆θ, ∆θ) ≤ a (∆θ)  
The three way collusion between the firm, supervisors S1 and S2 can be prevented if  
(19) (t(r1,φ, φ) - t (r1, ∆θ, ∆θ))k ≤ s2(∆θ,∆θ)+a(∆θ) - s2(φ,φ). 
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 Note that the three-way collusion refers to report of z and r2 only and does not affect the 
report r1. 
As discussed earlier, activism leads to S1 observing σ1 = ∆θ with a lower 
probability.  The loss to S1 will depend on the transfers which in turn depend on whether 
the no-collusion constraints are satisfied or not. Similarly the gain also will depend on 
whether activist S1 colludes with S2 or not. Fortunately, for the benevolent S1 it is 
straightforward because of the absence of collusion possibilities. Given our assumptions 
about technology (1 and 2), a benevolent S1 will choose to be activist iff 
(20) α[s1(∆θ) – s1(φ)] ≤ β[ a(∆θ) + A]  
Given our bargaining rule, a non-benevolent S1 will choose the activist technology iff 
(21) α max[(s1(∆θ) – s1(φ)), k(t(φ) – t(∆θ))] ≤ βδ2 a(∆θ) + β(1-δ2) max[a(∆θ) , (a(∆θ) + 
s2(φ, ∆θ) – s2(∆θ,∆θ))/2] 
Inequalities (20)- (21) will be referred to as incentive constraints, as they determine the 
incentives of S1 to be activist.  
The principal maximizes SW in (4) subject to constraints (5) and (16)- (21). Note that 
welfare under separation is given by either Wc (10) or Wnc  (11) and activism will be 
evaluated against these. Given our assumptions regarding θ and supervision technology, 
it will suffice to compare welfare in the relevant states only. Before we discuss the 
optimal outcome, the following lemmas provide useful partial characterizations. The 
proofs are collected in the appendix.  
 
Lemma 1: The incentive of S1 to be an activist is independent of the principal’s policy 
towards collusion between the firm and S2 
This enables us to separate the problem of collusion between S2 and the firm from the 
issue of activism. Hence it is not the case that non-benevolent S1 will be more inclined to 
choose the activist technology because of the presence or absence of incentive payments 
to S2. 
 
Lemma 2: Let δ2 ≤ 1-k, it is always optimal to prevent collusion between S2 and the firm. 
In the absence of activism this is a standard result (Laffont and Tirole 1993). This 
familiar collusion-proof principle holds in many regulatory settings. We need to show 
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 that this principle holds irrespective of whether the optimal policy entails any kind of 
activism or not. In the presence of activism, one might expect that the principal can allow 
some collusion because she can elicit same information from the benevolent activist S1. 
But the lemma shows that it is not true.  
However, notice that we are not making a similar claim about collusion between 
S1 and the firm. In this case, preventing collusion between S1 and the firm also raises the 
cost of inducing activism. Hence if the gain from activism is large and A = 0, we might 
see collusion even when δ1 < 1-k. This is confirmed later in Proposition 7. 
 
Lemma 3:  It is never optimal to prevent collusion between the supervisors. 
Collusion between S1 and S2 leads to redistribution of transfer payments. The sum of 
transfers to S1 and S2 is not reduced by preventing collusion between S1 and S2.  
  
Lemma 4: Suppose it is optimal to prevent collusion between S1 and the firm. Then 
depending on the nature of the optimal constitution, the set of optimal transfers is given 
by the following. 
M1 Strict Separation of Powers and No-Collusion: t(r1,r2) is given by (9) and  
sj(∆θ)=k∆θ, si(φ) = 0. 
M2: Activism and No-collusion: t(r1,z,r2) is given by (12) and  s1(φ) = s2(∆θ,∆θ) = 
s2(φ,φ) = 0, s2(φ,∆θ) =  s1(∆θ) = k∆θ and a(∆θ) = x ∆θ where x = max {0, αk/β  - 
A/∆θ }.   
In case of strict separation of powers with collusion (M1/), it is similar to M1 with s2(∆θ) 
= 0. Likewise, for the activism with collusion (M2/), it is similar to M2 with s2(∆θ,∆θ) =   
s2(φ,∆θ) = s2(φ,φ) = 0.  
Now, we can state the main result of the paper. In what follows we shall be making a 
distinction between allowing and inducing activism. When the principal allows activism- 
it is like a privilege being granted to the members of an institution and a(∆θ) = 0. 
Inducement, on the other hand, implies that the principal has to provide positive transfers, 
a (∆θ) >0.   
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 Proposition 5: Let 1-k, δ2 ≤ 1-α/β. The principal will allow (induce) activism if either (1) 
A is large and α≥ β/2; or (2) δ1 is high.  
Proof: We begin by noting that these are sufficient conditions. The optimal contract 
could entail activism even when neither condition is satisfied. It will be shown that 
limited activism can raise welfare when δ2 ≤ 1-α/β and 1-k ≤ 1-α/β. This is illustrated in 
Figure 1. However, this in itself does not mean that the principal would choose to have 
activism. This would depend on the social cost associated with activism by the non-
benevolent and the extent to which the principal can induce activism by the benevolent 
without inducing activism by the non-benevolent.   
 
(Figure 1) 
 
Case 1: Define A* to be the value of A such that the incentive constraint of the 
benevolent S1 (20) is satisfied for a(∆θ) = 0. Hence the claim applies to any A ≥ A*. In 
addition, the condition α≥ 2β implies that non-benevolent S1’s incentive constraint is 
never satisfied whenever a(∆θ) = 0 (see (40) in the appendix). Hence there is no risk of 
excessive activism in this case. 
For δ2≤ 1-k, the optimal contract will be of either type M1 or M2. Suppose, δ1 is such that 
it is optimal to have s1 = k∆θ. This case has been discussed earlier and limited activism 
will raise welfare iff (rewriting (15))  
(22) (1-k) ≤ β/α+β. 
This is shown as region II in figure 1. On the other hand, if δ1 is such that s1 = 0 is 
optimal, activism will be optimal iff 
(23) βk∆θ ≥ α∆θ or 1-k ≤ 1-α/β 
Region III represents the values for (23). It is clear that (22) is implied by (23).   
For δ2> 1-k, if δ1 is such collusion between S1 and the firm does not take place (s1 
= ∆θ) then activism is optimal iff  
(24)  (1-δ2)β∆θ ≥ α(1-k)∆θ. 
This refers to region I in the figure. On the other hand, when s1=0 the case is identical to 
the case discussed earlier and activism is optimal iff (rewriting (13)) 
 21
 (25)   δ2 ≤ 1-α/β.  
This refers to region IV in the figure. It is clear that (24) is implied by (25).  
Case 2: Suppose A = 0. We shall focus only on the case where δ1 is such that (16) holds 
and s1 =∆θ. Otherwise the situation is similar to the previous case with A ≥ A*. First 
consider δ2 > 1-k.  Using lemma 4, the benevolent S1’s incentive constraint is satisfied 
for x = αk/β (see (39) in the appendix). Limited activism will raise welfare if  
(26)  [(1-δ2)-αk/β]β∆θ ≥ α(1-k)∆θ or δ2≤ 1-α/β 
However, now non-benevolent S1 will also choose to be activist as (21) will also be 
satisfied. For the non-benevolent S1, there is no welfare gain and the welfare loss will be  
(27) α(1-k)∆θ + βδ2(αk/β)∆θ  
Hence overall welfare goes up if  
(28) βδ1(1-δ2)∆θ ≥ (δ1 +δ2(1-δ1)) β(αk/β)∆θ + α(1-k)∆θ 
or,  (β-αk)δ1(1-δ2)≥ δ2αk + α(1-k) 
Now consider δ2 ≤ 1-k. Since the value of x does not change, activism by the benevolent 
will raise welfare only if  
(29) β(k-αk/β)∆θ ≥ α (1-k)∆θ or 1-k ≤ 1-α/β. 
For the non-benevolent however there is now a possibility of welfare gain. Since the non-
benevolent can never collude with the benevolent S2 and the latter will always report 
truthfully, the principal saves on the transfers to the benevolent S2. In this case activism 
will raise welfare if  
(30) β(δ1k∆θ+(1-δ1)δ2k∆θ) ≥  (δ1+ (1-δ1)δ2) β(αk/β)∆θ + α(1-k)∆θ 
or,  (δ1+ (1-δ1)δ2) ≥ α (1-k)/k(β-α) 
Clearly, (28) or (30) can only be satisfied for high values of δ1. Note that in this case, 
activism will always be excessive. But given the high degree of benevolence among 
activists, the benefit of activism by the benevolent outweighs the costs associated with 
activism by the non-benevolent.    
This shows that activism is likely to be the optimal response only when the legacy 
motive is very strong or the activist institution is populated by benevolent individuals. 
The following proposition reinforces this point by showing how it is optimal for the 
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 society to forgo the potential benefits of activism by the benevolent because of the threat 
of excessive activism.  
 
Proposition 6:   
(i) Suppose δ1 >δ2/(1+δ2). It is never optimal to induce (allow) activism by the non-
benevolent S1 without activism by the benevolent. 
(ii) For low values of δ1 and δ2., the principal will choose strict separation of powers 
even when limited activism is potentially welfare improving.  
Proof:  
(i)  In general, activism by the non-benevolent does not lead to any welfare gain. Even if 
it does (for some parameter values of k, δ2, α, β), activism by the benevolent is also 
optimal in those situations. For the case α≥ β/2, this is shown in figure 1. Activism by the 
non-benevolent can be optimal in the region V, but it is contained in the region III where 
activism by the benevolent is optimal. Hence at the optimum we are likely to see either 
excessive activism or activism by the benevolent. 
We shall prove the claim for the case 1- 2α/β > δ2 and A = 0.  Not that in this case 
activism by the non-benevolent holds maximum advantage over activism by the 
benevolent. The non-benevolent S1’s incentive constraint is satisfied even when x = 0 
and the benevolent S1’s constraint is not satisfied unless x = αk/β.   
Consider δ2 < 1-k, otherwise activism by the non-benevolent has no positive benefit.  
Activism by the non-benevolent raises welfare if the following is true 
(31) (1-δ1)δ2 βk∆θ ≥ (1-δ1)α(1-k)∆θ 
or, δ2 > α(1-k)/βk. 
Condition (31) can be satisfied for high values of k; k ≥ α/(β-α). But these conditions 
imply the precise conditions (26 and 29) under which activism by the benevolent is 
welfare improving. Suppose we are in a situation where the non-benevolent S1 chooses 
the activist technology and the benevolent does not do so. Will principal induce activism 
by the benevolent? Note that cost of inducing activism by the benevolent is much higher 
since the non-benevolent S1 will also be paid a(∆θ,∆θ) = x ∆θ whenever the later meets a 
benevolent S2.  It can be verified that the principal will induce activism by the benevolent 
iff 
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 (32)   δ1α(1-k)∆θ ≤ δ1β(k∆θ-αk∆θ/β) – (1-δ1)δ2(αk/β)∆θ  
or,  k ≥ δ1α/ (δ1β- (1-δ1)δ2α). 
Since k ≥ α/(β-α); the above condition is satisfied whenever 
(33) δ1 ≥ δ2/(1+δ2). 
Hence if δ1 is not very low, we are likely to see excessive activism in this case. The other 
case, referred to at the beginning, can be analyzed in a similar fashion. 
 (ii) Since δ1 and δ2 are low, optimal separation of powers contract will be of type M1 
(since we are focusing on large values of k, k ≥ ½).  Consider α>βk and A = 0 such that x 
= αk/β. If benevolent S1 chooses the activist technology welfare goes up by β(k-αk/β)∆θ 
–α(1-k∆θ. Hence, limited activism can raise welfare. But non-benevolent S1 will also 
choose to be activist. Since δ2 is low, such activism is unlikely to raise welfare. The 
change in welfare resulting from activism by the non-benevolent is given by β(k-
αk/β)δ2∆θ - α(1-k∆θ. Hence overall welfare will be lower iff 
(34)  k(β-α) [δ1+(1-δ1)δ2] ≤ α(1-k) 
This will be true for a range of values of δ1and δ2. For example, if α = 0.3, β = 0.6 and k = 
2/3, the above inequality will be true for any δ1, δ2 ≤ 0.2.    
 
As mentioned earlier following the discussion of Lemma 2, the cost of inducing activism 
can affect the principle of collusion-proofness. This has no immediate implication for the 
welfare properties of activism; but given the importance of this principle, we note the 
deviation as the following proposition.   
 
Proposition 7: In the presence of activism it might be optimal to allow collusion between 
S1 and the firm even when δ1 <1-k.  
Proof:  Consider a situation where limited activism is optimal but the excessive activism 
leads to lower welfare than the strict separation case. If the principal is unable prevent 
activism by the non-benevolent S1, he would choose to have no activism at all. 
Let α = 0.2, β = 0.6, δ2 = 0.6, k = ½ and A = 0 and δ1< 1/2. Clearly, the optimal contract 
will stipulate s2 = 0. Suppose, the principal chooses to have incentive contracts for S1 so 
that s1(∆θ) = k∆θ. It can be verified that even with A = 0, limited activism will raise 
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 welfare compared to the separation case. From the incentive constraint of the benevolent 
(20), x= αk/β. The corresponding incentive constraint for the non-benevolent S1 is also 
satisfied and both will choose to be activists. The optimal mechanism will be of type M2/. 
Compared to the strict separation case with mechanism M1/, welfare will be lower iff 
(35) α(1-k)∆θ > δ1(1-δ2)β∆θ - αk∆θ(δ1+(1-δ1)δ2) 
It can be checked this inequality is satisfied. Hence there would be no activism. 
However, consider an alternative mechanism where s1 = 0. This would obviously lead to 
some welfare loss as the non-benevolent S1 will collude with the firm. Now, benevolent 
S1 can be induced to choose the activist technology for x = 0. The non-benevolent S1 
will not choose the activist technology as δ2 is high and x = 0. So we can have limited 
activism. The benefit of activism will outweigh the loss due to collusion if the following 
condition holds. 
(36) δ1 [ρ∆θ +(1-δ2)β∆θ] > ζ(1-k)∆θ 
Suppose ρ = 0.6 and ζ = 0.8, then this is satisfied for δ1 > 0.47.  
Notice that even when δ1 < 0.5, it is optimal to allow collusion between the firm and non-
benevolent S1.        
 
5. Discussion and Extensions 
  As mentioned in the introduction, we have chosen a regulatory framework to 
discuss how supervisors can exercise some power and engage in rent seeking.  
Supervisor’s role is restricted to gathering and reporting information. Their ability to 
manipulate this information is the source of their power and rent.  This framework has 
been used extensively to study issues related to collusion and capture in many regulatory 
settings. However, it can be argued that in some cases institutions (judiciary or legislature) 
are decision making bodies rather than information acquisition agencies. But since our 
main objective is to highlight the link between the corruptibility of an institution and the 
optimality of the consequent social outcome, there is no real loss of realism in our model. 
Reports by the supervisors uniquely define the social outcome.  A corrupt institution 
would imply suboptimal outcome. Activism in the sense of acquisition and reporting of 
information about this institution prevents the suboptimal outcome. 
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5.1 Over-riding Authority 
 It can also be argued that the present model fails to capture the basic asymmetry 
that exists between various branches of constitutional governance. Some of these 
differences were mentioned in the introduction but the model treats both supervisors in a 
similar way except that S1 has the privilege to report on S2’s signal. By common 
perception, it would appear that judicial activism is associated with power of the judiciary 
to over-ride the decisions of the executive and the legislature. This over-riding feature of 
judicial activism is not explicitly addressed in our model. However, this issue can be 
addressed in our model without any significant change to the results. 
Suppose the principal commits to a contract such that the transfers to the firm and 
S2 depend only on S1’s report z. This means that S2’s report is over-ridden whenever the 
S1 chooses to be an activist. This feature is already reflected in the optimal contract: s2(z 
= ∆θ) = 0 and t = t(r1, z) whenever z =∆θ.  The second supervisor’s report matters only 
when z = φ. If we interpret a null report as no-report then the over-riding nature of the 
activist report does not add anything to our model.  The underlying information structure 
in our model allows only two types of reports; φ or ∆θ. Given the hard nature of 
information, it does not make sense to have a situation where z = φ will over-ride r2 = ∆θ.   
Consider a slightly modified version of the model. The second supervisor 
observes θ2 with certainty but information is manipulable so that r2  ∈ {0, ∆θ}. This 
means that the second supervisor (non-benevolent) can collude with the firm whenever θ2 
= ∆θ and report r2 = 0.22  Assume that the activist supervisor also observes θ2 (though 
there is some information loss in observing θ1). In this setting the over-riding nature of 
the activist’s report can have significant implications for the non-benevolent activists. 
The non-benevolent activist will collude with the firm rather than the second supervisor. 
Even when the second supervisor is benevolent, there will be scope for collusion between 
the non-benevolent activist and the firm. With over-riding authority, the expected rent of 
the non-benevolent activist will be higher.  
                                                 
22 On the other hand, the supervisor can threaten to report r2 = ∆θ and engage in extortion whenever θ2 = 0. 
For simplicity, we are ignoring such cases. 
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 For more general and imperfect information technology, the sole dependence of 
public decision on the activist’s report may not have clear welfare implications for the 
benevolent supervisor; but it will certainly lead to a shift in bargaining power in favor of 
the non-benevolent supervisor. Our results concerning excessive activism and the 
associated welfare loss are likely to be reinforced in such a setting.   
 
5.2 Accountability 
The various branches of the constitution also differ in terms of the incentive 
structures they face. Members of the legislature are accountable to the electorate for their 
actions and seek re-election after a fixed length of time. Re-election possibilities 
determine their incentive to choose the optimal action. Members of the judiciary do not 
face such re-election and the desire to leave a legacy or reputation will probably act as an 
incentive for them. Recently, Maskin and Tirole (2004) have examined the optimal 
allocation of decision making powers in such a context. They show that when citizens 
have limited self-belief about the optimal action, politicians would tend to pander: choose 
the popular rather the optimal action. On the other hand, judges would not have to pander 
but would choose actions according to the legacy motive.  The legacy motive can work 
either ways; a congruent judge would choose the socially optimal action but a non-
congruent judge would choose the sub-optimal action.   
 Our model is quite different from theirs though some insights are common. We 
use a static regulatory framework whereas they use a dynamic political economy 
framework. Their main objective is to study the separation of powers and our objective is 
to look at activism when there is separation of powers. The optimality of judicial activism 
(or judicial decision making) depends crucially on the degree to which the private 
interests of these officials are aligned with society’s interests and the extent to which the 
electoral interests of politicians lead them to choose sub-optimal actions. This is similar 
to our observation that the benefits of activism depend on the fraction of benevolent 
supervisors (δ1, δ2) and the social loss associated with the second supervisor’s decision 
making (k∆θ). Maskin and Tirole argue that some decisions should be taken by the 
judges to protect the interests of the minority; judicial activism is also justified in many 
instances as a safeguard against the tyranny of the majority. 
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5.3 Returns to activism and occupational choice 
 The previous analysis makes it clear that the welfare properties of activism 
crucially depend on the degree of benevolence (δ1 and δ2).  However, the degree of 
benevolence may not be entirely exogenous; it can be affected by the nature and extent of 
activism. Recall that activism affects the rents accruing to the supervisors in various ways.  
If we assume that benevolence in any organization is determined by the presence of 
benevolent agents in the pool of applicants seeking to enter the organization, the 
composition of this pool can be affected by activism. While a detailed investigation 
would require us to look at the occupational choice of agents and possibly the selection 
procedures and is beyond the scope of the current paper, the following discussion aims at 
providing a few insights. 
 Let the fraction of benevolent individuals in the common pool of potential 
applicants be δ. The payoff from joining the bureaucracy (S1 or S2) is given by Vj, j =1,2. 
The payoff V0 from not joining the bureaucracy is distributed across some interval. An 
individual with Vj > Vi, i≠j and Vj > 0 will join Sj. We can write Vj as Vj = yj + wj + sj + 
bj, where yj refers to intrinsic benefit from joining Sj and wj , sj and bj refer to the 
expected wage, transfers and bribes in Sj. The term yj differs across individuals and its 
distribution will determine the allocation between S1 and S2. In addition, V can also 
include the legacy motive A which is zero for the non-benevolent but positive for the 
benevolent.  
 Suppose δ is high so that there is no need for any high powered incentives and w 
> 0 and s = 0.  In this case, since collusion is possible between the non-benevolent 
supervisors and the firm, bj > 0. Now, activism by the benevolent S1 would leave the 
benevolent S2’s payoff unchanged but it would lead to a fall in the non-benevolent S2’s 
payoff. This means that there will be a fall in the number of applicants for S2 leading to a 
rise in δ2.  Activism by the non-benevolent S1 would also lead to reduction in the number 
of non-benevolent applicants but by a smaller margin. On the other hand the number of 
non-benevolent applicants for S1 is likely to go up. Depending on the distribution of A, 
benevolent applicants for S1 can also go up.  
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  Alternatively, if δ is low, we are likely to see high powered incentives to deter 
collusion and w = 0 and s = k∆θ.  In this case, limited activism would reduce the 
expected the incentive payments to both benevolent and non-benevolent S2. Hence it is 
unlikely to affect δ2. Activism by the non-benevolent S1 would also reduce incentive 
payments to both types of S2, but the reduction is less for the non-benevolent because of 
collusion between the supervisors. Hence δ2 is likely to be lower.  A similar rise in non-
benevolence also holds for S1, as the payoff to the non-benevolent S1 is higher now. If 
the benevolent S1’s incentive constraint is binding, their payoff remains same. Overall, 
we are likely to see a fall in both δ1 and δ2. 
 Recall that activism is unlikely to be optimal if δ1 is low because the benefit of 
activism by the benevolent is likely to be less than the loss due to activism by the non-
benevolent. This suggests that we could begin with a situation where activism is optimal 
(for suitable values of k, δ2 and δ1), but the rent redistribution following activism 
eventually leads to a low δ1 rendering activism suboptimal. This reinforces our earlier 
point that activism in a limited form might have been good for the society, but once we 
allow it to become an institution and a source of rents the long-run consequences are 
likely to be detrimental to the interest of the society.  
   
 5.4 Activism by Multiple Institutions 
We can consider an extension to the symmetric case with both S1 and S2 having 
access to the activist technology and privileges. In the symmetric case one can see how 
activism by one institution affects the incentives of other institutions and can lead to the 
spread of activist policy. However, we shall not pursue a formal treatment of the 
symmetric case.   
So far as limited activism is concerned, this does not alter the basic analysis too 
much. However, excessive activism is more likely when both the institutions have access 
to activist technology and privileges. Notice that condition the left hand side of incentive 
constraint (21) is likely to be smaller for the non-benevolent S1 when S2 is activist. 
Realization of signal σ = ∆θ does not necessarily fetch k∆θ.  If S2 is non-benevolent, S1 
gets k∆θ with probability (1-β) and k∆θ/2 (assuming x = 0) with probability β. If S2 is 
benevolent, S1 gets nothing with probability β. Hence in switching from ζ- technology to 
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 ρ-technology, its loss is also lower. In some sense, activism by S2 induces the non-
benevolent S1 to be an activist as well.   
For example, let ζ = 0.8, ρ = 0.7, β = 0.5.  Assume that 16-17 hold and s> 0 and 
S2’s incentive constraint (20) is satisfied with x = 0. If S2 is non-activist, non-benevolent 
S1 chooses to be activist when δ2 <1/2. When faced with a completely activist S2 or only 
benevolent activist S2, the non-benevolent S1 will choose activist technology if δ2< 2/3. 
Whenever, 1/2 < δ2 < 2/3, non-benevolent S1 will choose activist technology only when 
benevolent S2 also chooses to be activist. Since excessive activism is mostly welfare 
reducing, this introduces a trade off between encouraging limited activism by more than 
one institutions and avoiding excessive activism.  
To see this trade off more clearly, suppose δ2 = 0.6 and k =1/3. For this set of 
parameter values, the benevolent supervisors (both S1 and S2) will always choose the 
activist technology irrespective of whether other non-benevolent supervisors choose to be 
activist or not. Now consider the non-benevolent S1’s choice of technology. Following 
the discussion of the previous paragraph, for δ1 < 2/3, non-benevolent S1 will also choose 
to be activist. Hence we have an excessive activism outcome. On the other hand, by 
withdrawing privileges for S2 (or S1 if δ1>1/2), we have an outcome where only the 
benevolent S1 will choose the activist technology.  
Suppose δ1 is low, say δ1 = 0.4. This means that in the symmetric privileges case, 
both S1 and S2 are completely (benevolent as well as non-benevolent) activists. By 
withdrawing S2’s privileges, activism is confined to only benevolent S1.  The principal 
loses the benefit from benevolent S2’s activism but gains in terms preventing ungainly 
activism by non-benevolent S1 and S2. Let WS and WAS refer to the welfare under 
symmetric (complete excessive activism) and asymmetric (limited activism by 
benevolent S1) cases respectively. It can be shown that WAS > WS.23 Hence, the principal 
is better off withdrawing S2’s privileges. It is interesting to note that even though S1 is 
less likely to be benevolent compared to S2 (δ1<δ2), the principal would choose to 
withdraw S2’s privileges rather than S1’s privileges. 
                                                 
23 WAS – WS =  δ1(ζ-ρ)υβk∆θ+ υ(ζ-ρ)∆θ(1-k)+ (1-δ1)(ζ-ρ)υ∆θ(1-k) - υρβk∆θ(δ2+(1-δ2)δ1) 
– (1-δ1)δ2υρβk∆θ. 
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 7. Conclusion 
 
Our analysis shows that activism can be good but it can also spread itself and 
result in welfare loss. Given the specialized nature of our model, the propositions have to 
be viewed with some reservations. But the general message can be applied to various 
situations. In the light of our discussion (section 2) of judicial activism, it can be said that 
the failure of other institutions like the Parliament and the government machinery has led 
to activist policy by the judiciary. In that sense, the role of judiciary has been laudable. 
However, this has led to a general perception that judiciary is supposed to play such an 
active role on a regular basis. Rather than focusing on how to improve working of other 
institutions, focus has shifted towards finding ways to enlarge the scope of judicial 
activism. This is a worrying trend and at some point will undermine the basic separation 
of powers.  Moreover, there is no reason to believe that judiciary is and will be seeking to 
maximize social welfare. This could lead to the type of excessive activism analyzed in 
our paper. Judicial activism can encourage other institutions to be activist as well. 
Political interference in the judicial and executive process is a case of such activism in 
this context. 
It would be interesting to take a broader perspective and consider different kinds 
of activism. This would include study of various activist groups and non-governmental 
organizations24.  There has been a significant increase in the visible presence of these 
groups. In many instances activist groups are not merely safeguarding public interests; 
they also seem to be engaging in direct provision of local public goods. The objectives of 
these groups may not always be aligned with broader social interests. The trade offs need 
to be examined carefully in these cases. 
As the preceding section shows our modeling attempt is only a first step. Issues 
related to detailed institutional features and dynamics have not been addressed. We hope 
to pursue some of these issues in future.  
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Besley and Ghatak (2001) have addressed the issue of NGOs in a recent work, though their focus is on 
the private-public nature of the relationship. 
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Appendix: 
 
Lemma 1: It is clear that the claim is true for (20). For the non-benevolent S1, note that 
whenever (17) holds it is also binding. The amount of rent to be shared is always k∆θ. 
Given out bargaining rules about two-way collusion bwteen the supervisors or the three 
way collusion, S2’s expected share in the rent is same.  
Lemma 2: (i) Consider the no-activism case. If collusion is allowed in equilibrium, s2 = 
0. Conditional on the supervisor receiving a favorable signal, expected loss from allowing 
 33
 collusion is (1-δ2)∆θ. From the no-collusion constraint (16), preventing collusion would 
require s2(∆θ) = k∆θ and s2(φ) = 0. Hence, it is optimal to prevent collusion iff δ2≤ (1-k).  
(ii) Now suppose, optimal policy entails activism by the benevolent S1. The principal 
gets a true report whenever z = ∆θ or S2 is benevolent. Depending on the value of A, 
a(∆θ)≥ 0 to satisfy the incentive constraint (20), but this cost does not depend on 
constraint (16). Suppose, (16) does not hold. Conditional on σ2 = ∆θ, collusion between 
the firm and non-benevolent S2 takes place with probability (1-δ1) + δ1(1-β). Since the 
loss to the principal from such collusion is ∆θ, the total expected loss from allowing 
collusion will be 
(37) (1-δ2)∆θ [(1-δ1) + δ1(1-β)] =  (1-δ2)∆θ (1-δ1β) 
On the other hand, from (16) it is clear that preventing collusion would require s2 (∆θ) = 
k∆θ. However, with benevolent activist S1, the principal can save on this transfer by 
choosing the following transfers to the supervisors. 
 a(∆θ) = x∆θ, s2(∆θ, ∆θ ) = 0 and s2(φ, ∆θ) = k∆θ and s2(φ;φ) = 0 
Note that x can be chosen in such a way that the benevolent activist’s participation 
constraint is satisfied. This is exactly same as the transfer in the case where collusion 
between the firm and S2 is allowed. Hence the cost of preventing collusion is given by 
(38) (1-δ1)k∆θ + δ1(1-β)k∆θ = k∆θ(1-δ1β). 
Hence collusion would be prevented iff δ2 ≤ 1-k. 
(iii) Exactly similar arguments hold for the case when the principal induces activism by 
the non-benevolent S1. The principal can receive the true report, conditional on σ2= ∆θ, 
whenever z = ∆θ and a (∆θ) ≥ k∆θ.  Hence collusion between the firm and S2 lead to a 
loss of (1-β)(1-δ2)∆θ.  On the other hand, prevention of collusion in this state costs (1-
β)k∆θ. Likewise, when a(∆θ) < k∆θ, non-benevolent S2 will not reveal the true z and 
would collude with non-benevolent S2. Hence the loss from allowing collusion would be 
(1-δ2)∆θ and cost of preventing collusion is k∆θ. Hence irrespective of whether collusion 
between the supervisors is allowed or not, it would be optimal to prevent collusion 
between the firm and the supervisor iff δ2≤1-k.          
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 Lemma 3: Given the previous lemma and the fact that null reports would not receive 
positive transfers, optimal transfers to the supervisors would be given by the following.  
(38) s2(∆θ,∆θ) = k/∆θ, s2(φ,∆θ) = k∆θ, s2(φ,φ) = 0, a(∆θ) = x ∆θ.  
Following our bargaining rule, non-benevolent S1’s payoff from collusion is ½ [x+(k-
k/)∆θ]. Collusion can be prevented if (k-k/)∆θ – x ≤ 0. The total transfer to S1 and S2 is 
exactly k∆θ. Hence, the principal does not gain anything by preventing collusion between 
the non-benevolent activist S1 and non-benevolent S2. Collusion in this case simply 
results in a redistribution of the transfer k∆θ. On the other hand, the principal can always 
increase welfare by lowering k/ and x, whenever activist S1 or S2 is benevolent.           
 
Lemma 4: Follows from the incentive constraints  (20) and (21),  Lemma (2) and Lemma 
(3). In the activist case, (20) holds as an equality and writing a(∆θ) as x ∆θ, it can be 
checked that  
(39) x = αk/β  - A/∆θ. 
For the non-benevolent S1, expected rent from activism is given by 
  βδ2x + β(x+k)/2 – δ2β (x+k)/2 
Hence (21) holds iff  
(40)  x ≥ k (2α – β(1-δ2))/  β(1+δ2)                          
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